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Recent Cases

to overturn the trial court's decision.
The dissenting judge stated that the
party seeking reversal bears the burden
of presenting a record sufficient to
demonstrate that error occurred. Consequently, when that party fails to sustain its burden, the court lacks discretion to reverse the lower court. The
dissent claimed that Sterling failed
to meet its burden and therefore,
the trial court's opinion should be
affirmed. 4Thomas Melody

Health Care Contracts May
Not Unfairly Limit
Uninsured Motorist
Compensation
In Brown v. Snohomish County
Physicians Corp., 845 F.2d 334 (Wash.
1993), the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated provisions in health
care service contracts that excluded
medical coverage to the extent benefits
were available through uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage. The
court found that the provisions violated
public policy favoring full compensation for innocent automobile accident
victims. Accordingly, the restrictive
contract provisions were held to be
enforceable only after accident victims
were compensated for general and nonduplicative special damages.
ContractProvisions Unjustly
RestrictedMedicalCoverage
In two related cases, a health care
service contractor denied automobile
accident victims complete reimbursement for medical expenses. In refusing
coverage, the contractor relied on contract provisions that provided compensation only to the extent that the claims
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surpassed the benefits from uninsured
or underinsured motorists ("UIM")
policies. In each case, the victims, who
both maintained UIM coverage, received significantly less compensation
for injuries than otherwise available
absent the contract provision.
In the first case, Ray Brown
("Brown") suffered serious injuries after
an automobile struck him. Medical
expenses for his injuries, as well as
damages for lost wages and pain and
suffering, totaled in excess of$160,000.
Public Employees Mutual Insurance
Company ("PEMCO"), the insurer of
both the driver and victim, paid the
limits of their respective policies: the
driver's liability insurance of $25,000,
no-fault medical coverage of $10,000,
and Brown's UIM coverage of $50,000
and personal injury protection of
$10,000.
Through his employer, Brown also
maintained a health care service contract with Snohomish County Physicians' Corporation ("SCPC"). SCPC,
however, limited Brown's recovery to
medical expenses above $70,000, stating that the contract contained a provision which limited recovery if the patient had access to UIM coverage, automobile "no-fault," or other similar
medical coverage. According to SCPC,
the provision applied to Brown's
$50,000 of UIM coverage, his $10,000
of personal injury protection coverage,
and the driver's $10,000 of no-fault
medical coverage, totaling the $70,000
for which SCPC maintained no responsibility.
Absent such provisions, Brown could
retain his $50,000 of UIM coverage.
Theoretically, the UIM coverage would
have compensated Brown for general
and special damages beyond ordinary
medical expenses. However, the provision effectively precluded the UIM
coverage as an avenue of recovery for
lost wages or pain and suffering damages.
Brown sought ajudgment invalidating the policy provision. The trial
court, however, rejected Brown's argument that the provision was unen-

forceable as against public policy.
Brown appealed this decision.
In the companion case, Ross Hogsett
("Hogsett") died from injuries sustained
in an automobile accident with an
uninsured driver. Hogsett's personal
injury protection coverage paid the
first $10,000 of medical expenses.
However, a dispute arose as to whether
SCPC or UIM coverage would compensate Hogsett for the remaining
$24,277.13 in medical bills. SCPC
claimed that a health care service contract provision, similar to the one in
Brown's case, precluded compensation
from SCPC because Hogsett had adequate UIM protection.
Hogsett's widow sought judgment
against SCPC declaring the restrictive
provision invalid, as well as injunctive
relief and damages under the Consumer Protection Act. The trial court,
however, denied Hogsett's motion.
Hogsett filed a timely appeal of this
decision.
The appellate courts affirmed the
judgments in both of the cases. The
Supreme Court of Washington, however, granted discretionary review of
both cases.
Principlesof InsuranceLaw Apply
The Supreme Court of Washington
first noted that in resolving the public
policy issue, the general rules governing insurance policies applied to the
health care service contracts. The court
stated that insurance companies may
limit liability if the restrictions are
consistent with public policy. However, the court also warned that violations of public policy may warrant
judicial intervention to invalidate the
unacceptable provision.
In evaluating the validity of the
provisions, the court relied on prior
Washington Supreme Court precedent
and extended the rule that an insurer
may recover only the excess that remains after the insured is fully compensated for a loss caused by another's
negligence. The court advocated the
rule as illustrative of a socially desirable policy that promotes the adequate
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indemnification of innocent automobile accident victims. Further, the
court reasoned that in the absence of a
specifically applicable statute, equity
demands that an injured party be compensated to the extent of the injury.
However, the court noted that similar
to insurance companies, health care
contractors may limit their liability to
prevent a victim from receiving duplicate compensation for medical expenses.
The Provisions Were Contrary to
UIM Purposes
The court noted that essentially, the
SCPC contracts containing the UIM
limitations deprived the insured of liability proceeds that would have been
available if the negligent motorist maintained insurance. The court reasoned
that this effect was contrary to the dual
purpose of UIM statutes: (1) to allow
injured parties to recover damages expected but for the culpable party's lack
of liability insurance; and (2) to provide the insured with an additional,
protective layer of coverage that "'floats
on the top of recovery from other
sources." Thus, the court concluded
that to fulfill the purpose of the UIM an
innocent injured party must first be
compensated for general and special
damages.
The court rejected SCPC's argument that a policy in favor of low cost
health care coverage outweighed the
interest in invalidating the limiting provisions. It acknowledged that while
low cost health care is clearly desirable,
SCPC failed to identify specific cost
increases. Furthermore, the court noted
that SCPC conceded that treatment of
automobile accident patients is a relatively minor portion of the total cost of
medical care provided under its health
care contracts.
Thus, the court found the provisions in the health contracts of both
Hogsett and Brown invalid and reversed the judgments of the lower
courts. o0
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Consumer Failed to Cancel
Home Improvement
Contract Within a
ReasonableTime
In Crystal v. West & Callahan,
Inc., 614 A.2d 560 (Maryland 1992),
the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that under the Maryland Door-To-Door
Sales Act, a consumer's right to cancel
a contract continues for a reasonable
amount of time when a seller fails to
disclose this privilege. However, the
court held that a delay of more than
one-and-a-half years exceeded the reasonable time standard and required the
consumer to pay both the cost of the
contract and its prejudgment interest.
Lower Court Finds Sales Act
Inapplicable
Joyce Crystal ("Crystal") owned a
waterfront home in Caroline County,
Maryland. She orally agreed that a
contractor,
Charles
Callahan
("Callahan"), would extend and enclose her screen porch. Crystal stated
that she was given a $10,000 estimate.
However, Callahan said he never gave
Crystal an estimate of the total cost of
the work.
In January 1989, Callahan submitted a bill for $13,448, and in April
1989, he gave Crystal a second bill for
$10,321. Crystal paid $2,000 and refused to pay the balance because the
total cost of the construction was more
than Callahan's alleged estimate, and
she was dissatisfied with the work.
Crystal eventually canceled the oral
performance contract, one-and-a-half
years after Callahan had completed the
work.
Callahan's employer, West &
Callahan, sued in the Circuit Court for
Caroline County for the balance of the
money owed under the contract. Crystal counterclaimed, alleging that
Callahan had violated the Maryland
Door-To-Door Sales Act ("Act"). This
Act states that a buyer has an absolute
right to cancel a contract for perfor-

mance within three business days.
Accordingly, the seller must make disclosures concerning this right. Crystal
said that Callahan had never informed
her of her right to cancel the contract,
thus violating the Act.
The lower court held that the Act did
not apply to this type of contract and
awarded West & Callahan $21,169, the
balance due under the contract. The
court also awarded prejudment interest
to West & Callahan. Crystal appealed
the decision to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals.
Reasonable Time Allowed To
CancelContract
On appeal, Crystal asserted several
arguments. First, she contended that
the Act applied to her home improvement contract. The appellate court
agreed, holding that the home improvement transaction did not fit any of the
Act's specific exceptions. Since this
contract for consumer goods and services met all of the Act's requirements,
the court overturned the lower court
and held the state statute applied.
Next, Crystal argued that since
Callahan continuously failed to inform
her of her right to cancel the contract,
her right never expired. Crystal said
that her cancellation one-and-a-half
years after completion of the work was
viable. The appellate court, however,
rejected this argument. The court noted
that the state's General Assembly had
considered and rejected language establishing a continuing right to cancel
door-to-door contracts. Furthermore,
while other state statutes allowed the
right to cancel to run until the seller
complied with the law, Maryland's
Door-To-Door Sales Act did not utilize this language. Accordingly, the
court held that the right to cancel a
contract did not continue until proper
disclosures were made by the seller.
Instead, the court found that when
the seller fails to give proper notice, the
right to cancel continues for "a reasonable time." The court would determine
a reasonable time period by evaluating
all the circumstances surrounding the
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